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No person shall be imprisoned for 
debt, but a valid decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction or agreement 
approved by decree of said court for the 
support of a spouse .. . shall not consti· 
tute a debt within the meaning of this 
section. 
Md. Const. art III, § 38 (emphasis added). 
The aforementioned section of the code 
also states that contractual spousal support 
is subject to modification unless the parties 
provide otherwise. Mendelson at 497, 541 
A.2d at 1336. 
With recognition of the plain language 
of the statutes, the court determined that 
[d]espite the amended language of arti-
cle III, § 8-103(b) of the Family Law 
Code, unless the separation agreement 
is made part of the divorce decree, it 
cannot be enforced by imprisonment 
for contempt. There being no order to 
pay the support, failure to ptry would 
merely be a breach of contract and not 
contemptuous disobedience of a court 
order. 
Mendelson at 497-98, 541 A.2d at 1337 (em-
phasis added). The court concluded that 
the separation agreement was separate 
from the decree of divorce despite the clear 
language of th.e statute. There was there-
fore no basis from which to modify the 
agreement. Id. 
The Mendelson court then examined the 
case law regarding non-merger clauses and 
the attendant beliefs held by members of 
the legal community resulting therefrom. 
The court recognized that prior to 1983 it 
was commonplace for attorneys to insert 
non-merger clauses in separation agree-
ments. Judge Bloom then cited two cases 
which discussed the effect of non-merger 
clauses, Id. at 1337 (citing Johnston v. 
Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983); 
Hamilos v. Hamilos, 297 Md. 99, 465 A.2d 
445 (1983», and reasoned that: 
[i]t was apparently believed that incor-
poration would make the agreement 
part of the decree while non-merger 
would preserve its contractual status. 
Thus, in the event of a breach, it was 
thought, the aggrieved party would 
have the choice of enforcing the decree 
or suing on the contract. Since such 
language is still being inserted in sep~ 
ration agreements, we suspect that 
Johnston has been ignored or misread. 
Id. at 495,541 A.2d 1336 (emphasis added). 
Mendelson relied primarily on the ration-
ale of Johnston, which concerned the ques-
tion of whether a separation agreement 
incorporated but not merged into a 
divorce decree was subject to collateral 
attack. Johnston explained the difference 
between the terms "incorporation" and 
"merger." Whereas "incorporation" is the 
mere identification and approval of the 
validity of a separation agreement, 
"merger" is a substitution of rights and 
duties.Id. at 498, 541 A.2d 1337. The sepa-
ration agreement is said to be superseded 
by the decree when the agreement is 
merged into the decree, and when the 
agreement fails to indicate whether it 
should be merged. As such, the agreement 
would be enforceable through contempt 
proceedings. Alternatively, if the separ~ 
tion agreement contains a non-merger 
clause, the agreement is not superseded by 
the decree and retains its "life" as a con-
tract. But, because the agreement is a con-
tract, it is not enforceable through 
contempt proceedings. In applying 
Johnston to the facts in Mendelson, the 
court held that since the separation and 
property settlement agreement was not 
made part of the decree, the agreement 
remained separate from the decree and 
thus could not be enforced through con-
tempt proceedings. Id. at 499, 541 A.2d 
1338. 
The court then turned its attention to 
the question of whether the separation 
agreement sub judice could be modified or 
terminated by the court. By the terms of 
the agreement, modification of spousal 
support could take place only upon appel-
lant's disability or retirement at age 60 or 
thereafter. Since the separation agreement 
was not merged, the agreement and not the 
decree dictated the conditions under 
which modification could be compelled. 
Due to the rule foreclosing collateral 
attack on agreements approved by a court 
of competent jurisdiction, "[t]he circuit 
court that issued that decree lost its contin-
uing jurisdiction over it and thus any 
power to modify it when the decree 
became enrolled." Id. at 500, 541 A.2d 
1338. 
The court held that the separation agree-
ment was unambiguous regarding the 
terms under which spousal support could 
be terminated. The conditions precedent 
to the termination of spousal support were 
remarriage of appellee, or the death of 
either party. Since neither event occured, 
the court held that the termination provi-
sions had not been activated. Id. 
The holding in Mendelson v. Mendelson 
will affect many areas of domestic practice 
in Maryland. Those who entered into sep~ 
ration agreements with non-merger clauses 
might refuse to pay spousal and perhaps 
even child support-the only recourse 
being an action for breach of contract. 
Cases concerning these and similar issues 
will undoubtedly lead to a review of 
Mendelson by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. In subsequent actions. 
Mendelson may be attacked as inconsistent 
with the intent of Johnston, Hamilos, the 
Family Law Article and the Maryland 
Constitution. Additionally, since the issue 
of non-merger clauses was clearly not the 
subject of appellant's action, the court's 
analysis regarding non-merger clauses may 
be considered dicta and given less weight. 
Finally, there lies the question of the 
potential liability of attorneys who 
inserted non-merger clauses in separation 
agreements, erroneously assuring clients 
that, in the event of breach, an action 
either for breach or contempt of court 
could be maintained. 
- Jules R. Brickel 
Coy v. Iowa: PLACING SCREEN 
BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND 
WITNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL 
VIOIA TES 1HE RIGHT TO FACE-
TO-FACE CONFRONTATION 
In Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. ~ 108 S. 
Ct. 2798 (1988), the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a plurality opinion, held 
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution gives a defendant the right to literal 
face-to-face confrontation with the 
witnesses against him. The plurality ar-
rived at its decision by emphasizing that a 
fair trial requires face-to-face confronta-
tion between the accused and the accuser 
in a criminal prosecution. 
In August of 1985, the appellant, John 
Avery Coy, was charged with sexually 
assaulting two minor girls while they were 
camping out in the backyard of the house 
next door to his. The girls claimed that 
Coy came into their tent, with a stocking 
over his head, while they were sleeping. 
Coy shined a flashlight in their eyes and 
told them not to look at him. Consequent-
ly, the girls could not identify his face. 
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At the beginning of the trial, the prose-
cution moved, pursuant to Iowa Code 
Ann. § 910.A14 (West 1987), to allow the 
complaining witnesses to testify either by 
closed circuit T.V. or behind a screen. The 
statute was enacted in an effort to make 
child witnesses more comfortable while 
giving testimony. The trial court allowed a 
large screen to separate the appellant from 
the witnesses during their testimony. By 
adjusting the lighting in the courtroom, 
the appellant was barely able to see the 
witnesses and they were not able to see 
him at all. 
Coy objected vehemently to the use of 
the screen on two theories. First, he 
claimed that the sixth amendment gives 
criminal defendants the right to literal 
face-to-face confrontation regardless of 
whether the complaining witness is 
uncomfortable while giving testimony. 
Second, Coy claimed that his due process 
right was violated since the screen would 
make him appear guilty even though the 
jury was instructed not to infer a 
presumption of guilt. 
The trial court rejected Coy's 
constitutional objections and simply 
instructed the jury not to draw an 
inference of guilt from the screen. Coy 
was found guilty of two counts of 
lascivious acts with a child. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Iowa rejected Coy's 
constitutional arguments and affirmed the 
result of the trial court. Coy '0. State, 397 
N.W.2d 730 (1986). The Iowa Supreme 
Court found that Coy's right to 
confrontation was not violated since his 
ability to cross-examine the witnesses was 
not disturbed. The court also found that 
the screen was not unfairly prejudicial to 
Coy.ld. 
Coy appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. With Justice Scalia 
writing for the plurality, the Court 
reversed the Iowa Supreme Court holding 
that a criminal defendant has a right to 
literal face-to-face confrontation of 
complaining witnesses. The plurality 
traced the right to confrontation to the 
beginnings of Western legal traditions, 
Roman law and early English law. Coy, 
__ U.S. at _______ 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing 
California 'O.Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice 
Harlan felt that the right to confrontation 
"'[s]imply as a matter of English' .. , 
confers at least 'a right to meet face to face 
all those who appear and give evidence at 
trial.'" California '0. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
In Green, the Court "described the 
'literal right to 'confront' the witness at 
the time of trial' as forming 'the core of 
the values furthered by the Confrontation 
Clause.'" Coy, __ U.S. at _______ 108 S. 
Ct. at 2801. The plurality in Coy agreed, 
holding that the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face 
encounter with the witnesses in front of 
the trier of fact. Id. at 2800. A fact can only 
be proved against a defendant by witnesses 
who confront the defendant at trial. Id. 
(citing Kirby '0. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 
55 (1899». 
Aside from precedent, the plurality also 
used numerous references to, and 
quotations from, antiquity to elaborate on 
the proposition that to have a fair criminal 
trial, human nature dictates the necessity 
of face-to-face confrontation between the 
accused and the accuser. Coy, __ U.S. at 
_______ 108 S. Ct. at 2801 (citing Pointer '0. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965». 
Confrontation has continued over time 
because a witness will feel differently when 
confronted with the defendant whom he 
could harm with his testimony. Coy, __ 
U.S. at __ , 108 S. Ct. at 2802. The 
plurality noted that "[i]t is always more 
difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his 
face' than 'behind his back.'" Id. If the 
witness does lie, his testimony is not as 
convincing when he is confronted by the 
defendant he is accusing. Id. 
The plurality recognized that while a 
witness might be upset by the face-to-face 
confrontation, the confrontation is likely 
to undo the false accuser. Consequently, 
when the sides are weighed, the 
constitutional protection of a right to 
literal face-to-face confrontation 
outweighs the uneasiness the witness may 
experience by the confr.ontation. Id. 
Applying these principles to Coy, the 
plurality concluded that the screen used at 
Coy's trial was an obvious violation of his 
right to confront the witnesses since it 
prevented the witnesses from viewing 
Coy.ld. Thus, the right to confrontation 
includes literal face-to-face confrontation 
along with the opportunity to cross-
examine. The State of Iowa argued that the 
right to confrontation was outweighed by 
the need to protect the two victims of sex 
abuse. The plurality disagreed with this 
argument when applying it to the facts of 
this case and the statute involved; 
however, they did indicate that the right 
to confrontation is not absolute. Id. There 
are certain interests that may outweigh 
rights which are implicit in the 
confrontation clause, namely, the right to 
cross examine the witness, see Chambers '0. 
J,lississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); the 
right to exclude hearsay, see Ohio '0. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1980); and the 
right to face-to-face confrontation with the 
witness at some time during the 
proceedings other than at trial. Kentucky '0. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987). 
The plurality felt that there may be 
explicit exceptions to the right to face-to-
face confrontation, though the exceptions 
would only exist in the furtherance of 
important public policy. Coy. __ U.S. at 
-> 108 S. Ct. at 2803. Expanding on 
this, the Court noted that the exception 
must be something "firmly ... rooted in 
our jurisprudence." Id. (quoting Bourjaily 
'0. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (citing 
Dutton '0. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970»). The 
plurality felt that the criterion of being 
"firmly rooted" was not met in this case 
since the Iowa legislature only made a gen-
eralized finding of necessity to allow the 
screen to be used. There were no findings 
that the specific witnesses in this case need-
ed to be protected by the screen. Id. 
As a final point, the plurality said that it 
was not necessary to discuss Coy's due 
process argument since his right to face-to-
face confrontation was violated. 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice 
White, wrote a concurring opinion agree-
ing with the plurality that Coy's right to 
confrontation was violated in this case. Id. 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She wrote 
separately to express that an appropriate 
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to allow the use of some device to protect 
the witness from viewing the defendant. In 
such a case, the interest would outweigh 
the defendant's right to face-to-face con-
frontation. 
The interest to protect child witnesses 
from literal face-to-face confrontation 
would be a proper compelling interest to 
allow something other than direct face-to-
face confrontation. Id. Justice O'Connor 
continued noting that the confrontation 
clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial .... " Id. Further-
more, the Coy decision should not be read 
to discourage state legislatures from pro-
tecting child witnesses. Even if certain leg-
islation is judged to run contrary to the 
confrontation clause, it might fall within 
an exception and thus the protection 
device may be used. 
In a bitter dissent, Justice Blackrnun, 
joined by the Chief Justice, felt that nei-
ther Coy's right to confrontation nor his 
due process right was violated.The dissent 
believed that the right to confrontation 
gives the defendant a "right to be shown 
that the accuser is real and the right to 
probe [the] accuser and [his] accusation in 
front of the trier of fact." Id. (Blackrnun, 
J., dissenting). Justice Blackrnun believed 
that these criteria were met in Coy's case. 
He noted that Coy could see the girls 
through the screen, the girls could see the 
judge, jury and counsel, and they could see 
the girls, the jury could see Coy while the 
girls testified, and the girls were told that 
Coy could see and hear them while they 
testified. Id. at 2806. The dissent argued 
that Coy's objection that the girls could 
not see him while they testified was too 
narrow. Justice Blackrnun felt that the 
plurality's holding that the witness must 
have the ability to see the defendant will 
put a roadblock in front of state legisla-
tures trying to protect child witnesses. 
Justice Blackrnun also felt that the con-
frontation clause has as its essential pur-
pose the right of cross-examination. Id. at 
2808. This was based on Dean Wigmore's 
statement that "[t]here never was at com-
mon law any recognized right to an 
indispensable thing called confrontation as 
distinguished from cross·examination." 5 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, 158 O. Chad-
bourn rev. 1974}. This principle is sup-
ported by the fact that many hearsay 
statements may be admitted at trial even 
though the defendant does not get to con-
front the person who made the hearsay 
statement. Coy, __ U.S. at -> 108 S. 
Ct. at 2809. As a further explanation of 
this point, Justice Blackrnun gave an exam-
ple of a blind person who could not see the 
defendant. With a blind person, however, 
the defendant could not make the same 
objection that Coy did. Therefore, Justice 
Blackrnun felt that the right to cross-
examine a witness was the essential part of 
the confrontation clause. 
Justice Blackrnun believed that the pro-
tection of children was an extremely 
important public interest to protect. Rec-
ognizing this, he felt that the use of the 
screen outweighed Coy's right to face-to-
face confrontation with the girls. 
Finally, Justice Blackrnun concluded 
that the screen did not unduly prejudice 
Coy such that his due process was vio-
lated. He noted that a screen does not im-
ply guilt as do other things like shackles. 
Id. at 2810. Furthermore, the jury was 
given an instruction which told them 
explicitly not to draw any inferences of 
guilt from the screen. Justice Blackrnun 
felt this was sufficient to overcome Coy's 
due process argument. Id. 
The plurality in Coy concluded that a 
defendant in a criminal trial has the right 
to literal face-to-face confrontation of the 
witnesses against him except in certain sit-
uations. These situations arise when there 
is a strong public policy interest which 
outweighs the right to confrontation. The 
Coy Court concluded that when a legisla-
ture enacts a statute based on general find-
ings, it will not be enough to show a public 
interest that outweighs the right to con-
frontation. It should be noted, however, 
that Justice Kennedy did not participate in 
this decision in any way. 
- Richard ],f. Goldberg 
Austin v. Thrifty Diversified: 
EMPLOYER'S liABILITY 
EXPANDED WHILE EMPLOYEE 
ON EMPLOYER'S PREMISES 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland in Austin v. Thrifty Diversified, 
76 Md. App. 150, 543 A.2d 889 (1988), 
rejected a wrongful death claim, but found 
that an employee who was injured after 
normal working hours while using his 
employer's equipment, on the employer's 
premises, and with the employer's permis-
sion, was covered instead under the exclu-
sive remedy of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. The court agreed with 
the trial court that the employee's death 
arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. 
Thrifty Diversified hired John Douglas 
Austin to work as a certified welder. On 
the day of the accident he received per-
mission to use the company's arc welding 
machine to repair the exhaust system on a 
friend's automobile. Austin was to per-
form the repairs on the employer's 
premises after his regular shift ended. 
While using the arc welding machine to 
make the repairs, Austin was electrocuted. 
Austin's parents instituted a wrongful 
death action. The employer moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that 
the exclusive remedy was under the 
Worker's Compensation Act ("the Act"). 
The Act lists the duties that employers 
owe to their employees. It provides, in 
pertinent part, that: 
[e]very employer subject to the provi-
sions of this article, shall payor pro-
vide as required herein compensation 
according to the schedules of this arti-
cle for the disability or death of his 
employee resulting from an accidental 
personal injury sustained by the 
employee arising out of and in the 
course of his employment without 
regard to fault as a cause of such 
injury .... 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, §15 (1957). 
Therefore, the question addressed was 
whether this accident arose out of and in 
the course of the decendent's employment. 
In answering this question, the court 
first looked at the causal connection 
between the injury and the employment. 
The court reasoned that but for his 
employment, Austin's death would not 
have ensued. Because he was an employee 
of Thrifty, Austin was allowed to use the 
company's arc welder for a personal pro-
ject on their premises. "Moreover, the 
instrumentality of the death, the place 
where it happened, and the activity giving 
rise to it were the same as those he [Austin] 
encountered in his employment;" 76 Md. 
App. at 159, 543 A.2d at 894. The court 
concluded that the accident arose out of 
the deceased's employment. 
The difficulty facing the court, however, 
was the question of "in the course of 
employment." Section 15 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act requires both "arising 
out of' and "in the course of employ-
ment." It is not an either/or test. Both fac-
tors must be present in order to apply the 
exclusive remedy of the Act. 
To determine if the activity meets the 
"in the course of employment" test, it 
must be shown that the activity is suffi-
ciently work-related to be an incident of 
employment. An activity is an incident of 
employment if "the employer expects or 
receives substantial benefit" from his 
employees participating in that activity. 
Md. App. at 160, 543 A.2d at 894. 
The court found that compensation ben-
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